Identifying and evaluating the challenges of the central bank's comprehensive supervision using multi-criteria decision-making methods
Keywords:
supervision, central bank, multi-criteria decision making, banking systemAbstract
Identifying and evaluating the challenges of comprehensive supervision by the central bank refers to processes in which the country's central bank seeks to identify the problems and weaknesses present in the supervisory and financial system, as well as to assess the impact of these challenges on the performance and stability of the banking and financial system. Overall, identifying and assessing supervisory challenges is of significant importance for the central bank, as it aids in maintaining financial stability and preventing crises, ultimately safeguarding the interests of depositors and enhancing the credibility of the nation's financial system. The objective of this research is to identify and evaluate the challenges of comprehensive supervision by the central bank. In this study, 10 experts in the fields of banking and economics identified 15 key challenges and subsequently responded to a questionnaire designed for this purpose. The results of the analyses conducted using the DEMATEL method indicated that among the identified challenges, the lack of transparency in the central bank's operations and legal constraints for more precise supervision were recognized as the most influential challenges. These challenges play a crucial role in the quality of supervision and the effectiveness of the central bank, and addressing them could contribute significantly to improving the performance and credibility of the country's banking system. The findings of this research may provide valuable insights for policymakers in designing appropriate strategies to strengthen supervision within the financial system.
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